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Unlikely to Succeed: How the Second Circuit’s Adherence
to the Serious Questions Standard for the Granting of
Preliminary Injunctions Contradicts Supreme Court
Precedent and Turns an Extraordinary Remedy into an
Ordinary One
I. Introduction
In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed
down its decision in Citigroup Global Markets v. VCG Special
Opportunities Master Fund Limited causing at least one lawyer to note that
“[t]he Second Circuit has now put itself on a collision course with the
Supreme Court. . . .”1 The subject matter of this potential collision course
is the appropriate standard for the issuance of preliminary injunctions in
federal courts.2 More specifically, it concerns the Second Circuit’s
continued use of the serious questions alternative as a substitution for the
requirement that a party seeking a preliminary injunction demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits despite recent Supreme Court precedent
that may be read to prohibit that alternative.3 The ramifications of this
potential jurisprudential conflict affect more than just the Second Circuit.
Other circuits, including the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, also allow a serious
questions alternative to substitute for the likelihood of success
requirement.4 Therefore, the fate of these circuits’ preliminary injunction
standard could very well be entwined with Citigroup’s fate.
Not only does Citigroup raise the issue of a possible deviation from
Supreme Court precedent, it speaks to the very nature of injunctive relief.
A preliminary injunction “is an exceptionally potent and far-reaching
remedy, the grant or denial of which often leads to a cascade of serious
consequences.”5 As such, a preliminary injunction has long been regarded
as an extraordinary remedy.6 Unquestionably, the injunction serves an
1. Tom P. Taylor, Civil Procedure – Injunctions: ‘Serious Questions’ Standard Alive
and Well For Preliminary Injunctions in the Second Circuit, 78 U.S.L.W. 1570 (2010).
2. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.,
598 F.3d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 2010).
3. See id.
4. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 208360, at
*4 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011); Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Int’l Registration Plan
Inc., 455 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (10th Cir. 2006).
5. KIRSTIN STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 2 (2009).
6. Id. at 3.
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important role in our judicial system. It has been used, after all, to
implement noble and necessary measures such as desegregating schools and
preventing potentially unconstitutional legislation from taking effect until
its constitutionality could be determined.7
Preliminary injunctions,
however, threaten the liberty of those defending against such relief.8 This
is, in part, because the risk of error is high in awarding a preliminary
injunction due to the fact that it is awarded before a full trial on the merits is
conducted.9 The requirements that must be met in order to enjoin another
party from commencing a specific action serve as a vital protection against
the potential error of issuing such an order prior to all the facts being
established.10 Therefore, any case concerning what requirements are
appropriate must be carefully analyzed so as not to turn an extraordinary
and already risky remedy into an ordinary and potentially more dangerous
one.
In Citigroup, the Second Circuit defended its continued practice of
allowing the serious questions standard to serve as an alternative to the
requirement that a party seeking a preliminary injunction demonstrate that
the party’s claim is likely to succeed on the merits.11 This note discusses
and analyzes the logic, accuracy, and possible implications of the Citigroup
decision. Part II discusses the relevant law before Citigroup was decided
including: (1) a brief history of equitable remedies such as preliminary
injunctions; (2) the relevant Supreme Court discussions of the standard for
preliminary injunctions; (3) the federal circuit courts’ applications of the
standard for preliminary injunctions; and (4) one of the most recent
Supreme Court decisions, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
affecting the standard for granting a preliminary injunction in federal court.
Part III provides an overview of Citigroup including the facts of the case
and the Second Circuit’s reasons for upholding the serious questions
alternative in the face of recent Supreme Court decisions. Part IV will
elucidate major flaws of Citigroup: (1) Citigroup disregards the plain
language of Winter; (2) Citigroup disregards the reasoning of Winter; and
7. See id. at 2.
8. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS
337 (1985).
9. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION 253 (2d
ed. 1993).
10. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-46
(4th Cir. 2009), partially vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010).
11. See Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.,
598 F.3d 30, 34-38 (2d Cir. 2010).
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(3) the elimination of the requirement that a movant demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits before being granted a preliminary
injunction significantly weakens a fundamental judicial safeguard for
parties who are under threat of being erroneously forced to act or to refrain
from acting, upon the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Finally, part V
briefly concludes that the only way Citigroup can be allowed to stand is if
Supreme Court precedent is disregarded.
II. Law Before the Case
A. Historical Perspective
Equitable remedies, such as preliminary injunctions, have historically
been deemed harsh, and as such are considered extraordinary.12 In the
words of one court, “[r]elief by way of injunction . . . is a harsh remedy that
is used only in special circumstances.”13 Equitable remedies are considered
harsh because, unlike remedies at law, an equitable order is an order against
the person.14 This means that, by being allowed to administer equitable
relief, a judge has the power to “command[] conduct of some specified sort,
and subject[] the defendant to a punishment if he [does] not obey.”15
Equitable relief is harsh not only because it forces a defendant either to act
or to refrain from acting,16 but also because the risk of error is high because
the defendant has not yet been afforded a full hearing on the merits.17
The classification of a preliminary injunction as an extraordinary
measure traces back to the reservations the founding fathers had about the
English Court of Chancery.18 Originally in England, only one court system
heard cases and handed down decisions in the name of justice.19 In this
system, a person desiring judicial relief commenced an action by
petitioning for a “writ.”20 If a writ were granted it meant that the common
12. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-4.
13. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Parmer, 496 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
14. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—
RESTITUTION 25 (1973).
15. Id.
16. See RUSSELL WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF REMEDIES LAW 5 (2007).
17. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 253 (recognizing that it is “[a] possibility that
preliminary relief will prove to be erroneous when a full trial on the merits is held”).
18. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-11.
19. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
20. ROBERT S. THOMPSON & JOHN A. SEBERT JR., REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND
RESTITUTION 220 (2d ed. 1989).
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law court was directed “to hear and adjudicate the case.”21 The type of writ
that a litigant needed depended on the type of action. Indeed, “[t]here was a
different form of writ for each form of action.”22 Unless “the facts [of the
particular case] fell within the scope of an existing writ,” a litigant did not
have a cause of action.23 As a result, some litigants, despite having suffered
injustices, were left without remedy simply because their facts did not fall
in line with any existing writs.24 The English common law system thus
became a system that was “hidebound by formality and restrictions.”25
In response to this formulaic and rigid system, litigants began by-passing
common law courts and petitioning the King himself to provide relief for
claims that fell outside of the writ system.26 Originally the King answered
all petitions, but as the number of petitions grew, the King, like most
executives, chose to delegate.27 The King appointed Chancellors to resolve
the petitions.28 As a result, the late 15th century saw the creation of the
Court of Chancery.29 Not bound by the writ system of remedies, the
Chancellors had the ability to issue equitable relief. Equitable relief requires
a party to “engage, or refrain from engaging, in specific acts.”30 Among
equitable powers, the Chancellors were vested with the right to “exercise[]
the King’s arbitrary power to ‘do justice’ in certain cases, including the
power to grant injunctive relief.”31 The men selected to serve as
Chancellors “were initially selected primarily from the high ranking
clergy.”32 Chancellors “enjoyed a wide discretion to grant injunctive
relief.”33 In line with their ecclesiastical origin, the Chancellors often
turned to conscience and morality when determining whether to issue an
injunction and other equitable relief.34 This led to the appearance that
21. Id.
22. R.J. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 20-21 (6th ed. 1985).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 43-44.
25. Id. at 42.
26. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5; WALKER, supra note 22, at 44.
27. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5; WALKER, supra note 22, at 44.
28. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5 (explaining that originally a plaintiff could
bypass the King’s Court and petition the King himself but due to the volume of these
petitions, the King delegated judgment on these petitions to his Chancellor).
29. See WALKER, supra note 22, at 44.
30. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 7.
31. STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-11.
32. THOMPSON & SEBERT JR., supra note 20, at 220; see WALKER, supra note 22, at 44.
33. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-4.
34. See id. at 3; THOMPSON & SEBERT JR., supra note 20, at 222 (stating that “true to their
ecclesiastical origin, chancery courts continued to act ‘in equity as a court of conscience’”).
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decisions handed down by the Court of Chancery were based on moral
whims of the conscience instead of legal principles.35
The wide discretion afforded to Chancellors, combined with an absence
of concrete legal principles, resulted in many decisions of the Court of
Chancery being criticized as improper and unnecessarily arbitrary.36 The
sometimes harsh remedies of equity were imposed with little regard to
consistency as well as little to no mechanisms for keeping in check the
personal agendas of the Chancellors. Unregulated Chancellor discretion
motivated Thomas Jefferson’s Anti-Federalists to oppose the idea of
allowing federal judges to distribute equitable relief in the newly formed
United States.37 The Anti-Federalists’ main concern was that allowing
federal courts to have such power “would invest judges with arbitrary
Chancellor-like power ‘to decide as their conscience, their opinions, their
caprice, or their politics might dictate.’”38 Alexander Hamilton attempted
to assuage Anti-Federalists’ concerns, assuring that “the great and primary
use of a court of equity [will be] to give relief in extraordinary cases.”39 In
line with Hamilton’s views, United States federal courts have traditionally
held that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and as such
should not be imposed absent special circumstances.40
B. The Supreme Court’s Rulings on Preliminary Injunction Before Winter
Due to the belief that preliminary injunctions are “extraordinary” and
should not be used except in special circumstances, the Supreme Court has
consistently held there is no absolute right to a preliminary injunction in
any situation.41 Since there is no right to receive injunctive relief, whether
such relief is awarded is generally left up to the discretion of the district
court.42 Although a district court has discretion to determine whether or not
35.
36.
37.
38.

See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-4.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4 (quoting Fed. Farmer No. 15, Jan. 18, 1788, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 322-23 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 569 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
40. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S.
968, 972 (1997).
41. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (stating that injunctive relief is not a matter of right even
in cases where the movant may eventually suffer irreparable harm).
42. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 664 (2004) (stating that “[the Supreme]
Court, like other appellate courts, has always applied the abuse of discretion standard on
review of a preliminary injunction.”); Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440.
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to award a preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court issued guidelines that
a court must consider when determining whether such relief is
appropriate.43 Such guidelines make sense given that the founders did not
fear all discretion, just unchecked, arbitrary discretion like that of the
Chancellors in England.
In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., the Supreme Court emphasized two
traditional requirements a plaintiff must meet in order to be awarded a
preliminary injunction:44 the plaintiff must “show that in the absence of
[the preliminary injunction’s] issuance he will suffer irreparable harm and
that he is likely to prevail on the merits.”45 The Doran Court noted that
“the standard to be applied by the district court in deciding whether a
plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction is stringent.”46 In line with
this stringency, the Supreme Court continues to require a party to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of a case in order to be
awarded a preliminary injunction.47
In addition to the two requirements laid out in Doran, the Supreme Court
also instructed courts to “balance[] the conveniences of the parties and
possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting
or withholding of the injunction.”48 This factor is often referred to as
“balancing the equities”49 or “balancing the hardships.”50 Essentially, it
requires a court to weigh the burdens that will be placed on the defendant if
the injunction is issued against the burdens on the plaintiff if relief is
denied.51 Finally, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to take into
consideration the effect that the issuance or denial of a preliminary
injunction would have on public interests.52
As a result, even though Doran states only two factors in the
“traditional” test for preliminary injunction, federal courts have developed a
43. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
44. Id. at 932.
45. Id. at 931.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428
(2006); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); Grupo Mexican de Desarrollo v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 340 (1999).
48. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Village of Banbell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987).
49. RICHARD L. HASEN, REMEDIES: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 193 (2d ed. 2010).
50. WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 12.
51. See Heritage of America, LLC v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 66, 78-79 (Fed. Cl.
2007).
52. Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 542.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss3/5

2012]

NOTES

443

four-part traditional test for determining whether a court should grant a
motion for preliminary injunction.53 The four factors can be stated as such:
“(1) the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if the
injunction is not granted; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and
the injury that granting the injunction would inflict on defendant; (3) the
probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public
interest.”54
C. Circuit Court Confusion
Even though the Supreme Court has set forth the factors that should be
considered when determining whether preliminary injunctive relief is
appropriate, there has been little agreement among the federal circuit courts
on exactly how to articulate the appropriate factors or how those factors
should be applied.55 For instance, some courts rely on a two-part test, some
a three-part test, and others the traditional four-part test.56 Whether factors
should be articulated in a four part, three part, or two part test is beyond the
scope of this note. For purposes of this note, the traditional four part test
and the serious questions alternative to the likelihood of success
requirement are relevant. Federal circuits also differ widely on how the
factors should be applied.57 Significant approaches include the sliding scale
test, the serious questions version of the sliding scale, and the threshold test.
1. Sliding Scale Approach
The “sliding scale approach” is a common method of applying Doran
factors.58 The United States Court of Federal Claims has articulately and
succinctly explained the sliding scale approach.59 In applying the four
traditional factors, the court, in Eskridge Research Corp. v. United States,
stated, “[n]o single factor is determinative and the ‘weakness of the
showing regarding one factor may be overborne by the strength of the
others.’”60 The D.C. Court of Appeals described this approach similarly:
“[the traditional four factors] interrelate on a sliding scale and must be

53. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed. 1995).
54. Id.
55. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 118 (1991).
56. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 19-20.
57. See id. at 19-20.
58. LAYCOCK, supra note 55, at 118.
59. See Eskridge Research Corp. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 88, 96 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
60. Id. at 96 (quoting FMC Corp. v. United States, 3 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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balanced against each other.”61 The court clarified, “[i]f the arguments for
one factor are particularly strong, an injunction may issue even if the
arguments in other areas are weak.”62
Some courts couch this approach as a “balancing” test but in essence the
balancing involves the same analysis as applying the “sliding scale.”63 In a
circuit that adopts this approach, the movant need not fully establish that
each individual factor weighs in his favor, but instead must show that the
factors as a whole weigh in his favor.64 For example, a party may not be
able to establish that the irreparable harm that it will suffer absent
injunction will outweigh the harm to the other party if the injunction is
granted. But that party can still obtain an injunction so long as the party
makes a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits.65 Likewise,
a strong showing of irreparable harm may allow an injunction to be granted
despite a weak showing of likelihood of success.66 This approach eases the
plaintiff’s burden compared to an approach that requires a plaintiff to prove
that each factor is in his favor.
2. Serious Questions Test: Sliding Scale Redux
As long as there are serious questions going to the merits of the case,
some circuits allow the grant of a preliminary injunction without the
movant showing a likelihood of success on the merits.67 Although this
approach is couched as the “serious questions standard,” in application it

61. Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
62. Id. (quoting CityFed Fn. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 746
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
63. See In re Delorean, 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the factors
were “not prerequisites that must be met” but rather were to be balanced against one another
in such a way that one factor may be weak so long as the other factors are strong enough in
plaintiff’s favor that they balance out the weak factor); Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys.,
Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that “no single factor is determinative, and
thus if the showing of irreparable harm is weak, an injunction can be granted so long as the
showing of likelihood of success is strong.”).
64. See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582
F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009).
65. See Dataphase Sys. Inc., 640 F.2d at 113.
66. See Serono Labs., 158 F.3d at 1318 (stating that an injunction may be granted if the
arguments for one factor are strong and the arguments for another are weak).
67. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 208360, at
*4 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities
Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010); Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v.
Int’l Registration Plan Inc., 455 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006).
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proves simply to be a version of the sliding scale approach.68 More
specifically, it functions as a qualified sliding scale.69 A full-fledged sliding
scale approach generally allows an injunction to issue when any factor is
weak as long as other factors are strong enough to balance out the weak
factor.70 The serious questions standard, on the other hand, deals
specifically with the weakness of the likelihood of success on the merits.71
For instance, in Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
International Registration Plan Inc., the Tenth Circuit stated that a movant
must establish all four of the traditional factors in order to be awarded a
preliminary injunction.72 This test, however, becomes modified if the
movant shows that the likelihood of irreparable harm, the balance of the
equities, and the public interest factors “tip strongly in his favor.”73 This
modified test allows the movant to be awarded an injunction merely by
showing the existence of “serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful”
questions as to the merits of the case in lieu of demonstrating a likelihood
of success on the merits.74
The Second Circuit, in cases like Citigroup, allows the serious questions
standard wholly to substitute for a movant showing a likelihood of success
on the merits.75 Importantly, however, the Second Circuit’s serious
questions alternative proves to be less stringent than the standard applied by
the Tenth Circuit.76 In Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., the
Second Circuit stated that a plaintiff can obtain a preliminary injunction by
showing he will suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction. Moreover,
the plaintiff must show: “(1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) [a]
sufficiently serious question going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party
requesting the preliminary relief.”77 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit’s
language in Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission only allows the
68. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 2011 WL 208360, at *4.
69. Id.
70. See Serono Labs. Inc., 158 F.3d at 1317-18; Dataphase Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d at 113.
71. See Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 455 F.3d at 1113.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. (quoting Davis, 302 F.3d at 1111).
75. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598
F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc, 596 F.2d 70, 72
(2d Cir. 1979).
76. Compare Jackson Dairy, Inc., 596 F.2d at 72 with Oklahoma ex rel. Okla, Tax
Comm’n, 455 F.3d at 1113.
77. Jackson Dairy, Inc., 596 F.2d at 72.
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serious questions alternative if the movant can establish that all the other
factors tip decidedly in his favor.78 Jackson Dairy, Inc., on the other hand,
requires the movant to show only that the balance of hardships tips
decidedly in his favor in order to reach the serious questions alternative.79
3. Threshold Test
Finally, some circuits require all four factors80 to be established, or at the
very least the Doran traditional two factors,81 or treat one or more of the
traditional requirements as thresholds that must be met before a court
considers other requirements.82 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that a movant should not be awarded a preliminary injunction unless all
four prerequisites are “clearly established.”83 The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that the “grant[ing] of preliminary injunction ‘is the exception
rather than the rule,’ and plaintiff must clearly carry the burden of
persuasion.”84 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit held that prerequisites for
preliminary injunctions must be clearly established by the plaintiff based on
the fact that there is no right to a preliminary injunction and it is an
exception to the rule rather than the rule itself.85 Other circuits apply this
standard more narrowly and emphasize that one or more factors are the sine
qua non of the remedy of injunctive relief.86 For instance, the First Circuit

78. See Oklahoma ex rel. Okla, Tax Comm’n, 455 F.3d at 1113.
79. Jackson Dairy, Inc., 596 F.2d at 72.
80. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 53, § 2948 (stating the four traditional
factors as “(1) the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if the injunction
is not granted; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the
injunction would inflict on defendant; (3) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the
merits; and (4) the public interest”).
81. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (stating that the two
traditional factors are irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits).
82. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-46
(4th Cir. 2009), partially vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010); Siegel v.
Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that “even if [p]laintiffs establish a
likelihood of success on the merits, the absence of irreparable injury would, standing alone,
make preliminary injunctive relief improper.”).
83. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176.
84. Id. (quoting Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)).
85. Texas V. Seatrain Int’l, 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (however, the court
confusingly also endorses a sliding scale approach in the same decision).
86. See New Comm. Wireless Servs. v. Sprintcom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2002);
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d
1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990).
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stated, “if the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed
in his quest, the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity.”87
D. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council
In 2008, the Supreme Court clarified not only which factors should be
used in determining whether a federal court should grant a preliminary
injunction, but also how the factors should be applied.88 The Winter Court
stated that, in order to be awarded a preliminary injunction, a movant “must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”89
Significantly, the Court spent relatively little time discussing the likelihood
of success requirement and did not address whether it intended to prohibit
the serious questions alternative to the likelihood of success requirement.90
The Winter decision remains significant, however, because it may have
direct implications for the future of the sliding scale approach. While the
Court never explicitly overruled the sliding scale, it declared the lower
court’s grant of a preliminary injunction on a showing of “possible”
irreparable harm inappropriate regardless of whether the movant had made
a strong showing on the likelihood of success requirement.91 It appears,
therefore, that Winter should be read to hold that a weak showing on
irreparable harm cannot be balanced by the strength of other factors.92
It may be argued that the Winter decision is a qualitative holding that
should be read to negate the sliding scale approach only in situations where
the strength of other factors are needed to compensate for the inability to
show that irreparable harm is likely. In other words, Winter may be read to
negate the sliding scale approach when used to compensate for a weak
showing of likelihood of success on the merits.93 However, the reasoning
87. New Comm. Wireless Servs., 287 F.3d at 9 (citing Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d
11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)).
88. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
89. Id.
90. See id. It is curious that the Court did not include a serious questions alternative
despite the fact that this case was appealed from the Ninth Circuit, a circuit that has
employed the serious questions alternative in the past in its formulation of the factors for
preliminary injunction.
91. See id. at 375-76.
92. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 34547(4th Cir. 2009), partially vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010).
93. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 208360, at
*4 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities
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in Winter could have serious implications for the circuits which utilize the
serious questions standard. The Winter Court held that allowing a
diminished showing of irreparable harm would be “inconsistent with [the
Court’s] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy
that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled
to such relief.”94 As a result, the Court appears to have held that a light
showing of one of the factors is insufficient not because of that particular
factor’s relative importance95 but because the extraordinary nature of
preliminary injunctions requires a movant to demonstrate clearly that all of
the factors are in his favor.96 This interpretation of Winter would mean that
the likelihood of success requirement must be established on its own and
that a lesser showing of that requirement, such as serious questions as to the
merits, is inappropriate regardless of the strength of the other factors.97
This reasoning is consistent with previous Supreme Court discussions of the
standard for preliminary injunctions.98 In Doran, for example, the Court
held that the test for preliminary injunctions should be “stringently”
applied.99 Likewise, in Grupo Mexican de Desarrollo, Justice Ginsburg
specifically addressed the likelihood of success requirement, stating that
“[p]laintiffs with questionable claims would not meet the likelihood of
success criterion.”100 Justice Ginsburg continued, “as a general rule, [a]
plaintiff seeking [a] preliminary injunction must demonstrate a reasonable
probability of success.”101 Despite the language of Winter, circuits remain
split as to whether Winter overrules the sliding scale approach to the
granting of preliminary injunctions.102 Therefore, the question still remains
Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010).
94. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374, 375-76.
95. There is a series of cases that hold that the irreparable harm factor is the sine qua
non of the preliminary injunction test (e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d
1223, 1241 (11th Cir.2005)). Therefore an argument can be made that the ruling in Winter
could be attributed to the importance of the irreparable harm factor.
96. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375-76.
97. See Real Truth About Obama, 575 F.3d at 345-47.
98. See Grupo Mexican de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 340
(1999); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975).
99. Doran, 422 U.S. at 931-32.
100. Grupo Mexican de Desarrollo, 527 U.S. at 340 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (citing WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 53, § 2948.3, at 184-88).
101. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing WRIGHT, MILLER
& KANE, supra note 53, § 2948.3, at 184-88).
102. Compare Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL
208360, at *4-7 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011) with Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-47(4th Cir. 2009), partially vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d
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as to whether it is appropriate to utilize the serious questions alternative in
determining whether to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction. The
Second Circuit considered this precise issue in Citigroup v. VCG Special
Opportunities Master Fund Limited.103
III. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., v. VCG Special Opportunities Master
Fund Limited
A. Facts and Procedural History
VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Limited (VCG), a hedge fund,
and Citigroup Global Markets, Incorporated (CGMI) entered into an
agreement in which CGMI would “provide prime brokerage services by
clearing and settling trades in fixed income securities for VCG.”104 After
this brokerage services agreement was consummated, VCG “entered into a
credit default swap agreement with Citibank, N.A. (Citibank).”105 Because
both were under the “corporate umbrella of Citigroup, Inc.,” Citibank was
an affiliate of CGMI.106 Due to Citibank “declar[ing] a writedown of the
assets covered in [the] credit swap[,]” VCG was obligated to pay Citibank
$10,000,000.107 In response, VCG sued Citibank, claiming that declaring
the writedown was a breach of the credit swap agreement.108 The district
court ruled in favor of Citibank.109
At the same time VCG sued Citibank, VCG also entered into an
arbitration with CGMI in accordance with rules set out by the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).110 FINRA “requires members . . .
to arbitrate disputes . . . if arbitration is ‘requested by [a] customer,’ ‘[t]he
dispute is between a customer and a member . . .’ and ‘[t]he dispute arises
in connection with the business activities of the member.’”111 VCG
claimed it was CGMI’s customer and therefore that CGMI was supposed to
serve as a middleman between VCG and Citibank in the credit swap

355 (4th Cir. 2010).
103. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598
F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010).
104. Id. at 32.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting FINRA Rule 12200).
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agreement.112 CGMI claimed that VCG was not a customer of CGMI for
purposes of the credit swap agreement, and thus that CGMI was not
obligated to serve as a middleman between VCG and Citibank.113
According to CGMI, since VCG was not a customer for purposes of the
credit swap, it had no duty to enter into arbitration with VCG on the
issue.114 Based on its arguments, CGMI filed suit in the “[federal] district
court to permanently enjoin the arbitration.”115
After filing suit, CGMI moved to obtain a preliminary injunction in order
to enjoin arbitration until a final judgment was issued on its suit to enjoin
the arbitration permanently.116 In response to the motion for a preliminary
injunction, VCG argued that the credit swap agreement was recommended
by CGMI and that terms for the agreement were accordingly set by
CGMI.117 VCG further argued that CGMI representatives dealt with VCG
with regards to the credit swap agreement.118 CGMI countered by stating
that the representatives, while working in connection with the credit swap
agreement, were acting as agents of Citibank, not CGMI.119 To bolster its
claim, CGMI introduced evidence that VCG, in its initial disclosures, listed
two of these representatives as being employed by Citibank, not CGMI.120
The district court held that although CGMI had established that it was
likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was not issued, it failed to
demonstrate a probability of success on the merits.121 Nevertheless, the
district court granted the preliminary injunction and applied the serious
questions test in lieu of the likelihood of success requirement.122
Specifically, the district court ruled that whether VCG was a customer of
CGMI for purposes of the credit swap agreement raised serious questions as
to the merits of the case.123 In addition, the district court held that the
balance of hardships tipped decidedly in CGMI’s favor.124 VCG filed a
motion to reconsider the ruling on the grounds that Winter eliminated the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 34.
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serious questions alternative to the likelihood of success on the merits
factor.125 The district court denied the motion and VCG appealed to the
Second Circuit.126
B. The Second Circuit’s Decision
The Second Circuit focused its decision on whether “the district court
abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard to CGMI’s
request for preliminary injunction.”127 The court considered whether recent
Supreme Court decisions, including Winter, “eliminated [the Second]
[C]ircuit’s ‘serious question’ standard for the entry of a preliminary
injunction.”128 The Second Circuit panel unanimously held that the
Supreme Court did not overrule the circuit’s long-standing practice of
utilizing the serious questions standard.129
In determining that the serious questions alternative was still valid, the
Citigroup court offered four justifications.130 First, the court stated that the
serious questions alternative was justified on policy grounds.131 The court
feared that the result of applying a strict requirement that a movant
demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits would limit preliminary
injunctions “to cases that are simple or easy.”132 The court noted the
varying complexity of cases: “[t]he value of this circuit’s approach to
assessing the merits of a claim at the preliminary injunction stage lies in its
flexibility in the face of varying factual scenarios and the greater
uncertainties inherent at the outset of particularly complex litigation.”133
The court inherently stated that a strict application of the likelihood of
success requirement could rarely, if ever, be applied in a complex case
because it would be impossible for a judge to determine if the movant is
likely to succeed until the complexities have been fully litigated.134 The
court did acknowledge the policy consideration that allowing a softer test in
lieu of likelihood of success appears to lessen the burden on the movant in
proving that an injunction should be awarded.135 However, the court
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 35-39.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 35.
Id.
See id. at 35-36.
Id. at 35.
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clarified that in order to benefit from the softer serious questions standard,
the movant must “establish that ‘the balance of hardships tips decidedly’ in
its favor,” thereby insisting that the burden on the movant is no lighter than
it would be if he were required to establish likelihood of success on the
merits.136
Second, the Citigroup court cited specific Supreme Court cases in order
to justify the serious questions alternative.137 The court began with Ohio
Oil Co. v. Conway, a 1929 decision138 in which the Supreme Court
confronted a factual dispute concerning a state tax on oil revenues.139 The
Citigroup court cited the following language: “[w]here the questions
presented by an application for an interlocutory injunction are grave, and
the injury to the moving party [in the absence of such an injunction] will be
certain and irreparable . . . the injunction will usually be granted.”140 The
Citigroup court also cited to Mazurek v. Armstrong, claiming that the
Mazurek Court recognized a “fair chance” standard for proving likelihood
of success.141
Third, the Citigroup court narrowly construed Winter and other recent
Supreme Court decisions instructing that a movant must demonstrate
likelihood of success on the merits in order to receive a preliminary
injunction.142 The court noted the absence in recent cases of commentary
on the serious questions alternative.143 The court distinguished Winter by
stating that it was decided on the issue of the balance of the equities and
public interest and therefore that it “expressly withheld any consideration of
the merits of the parties’ underlying claims.”144 Because the Winter Court
did not determine whether the movant had demonstrated a likelihood of
success, the Citigroup court held that Winter should have no effect on the
serious questions alternative.145 Citigroup distinguished another recent
Supreme Court decision, Munaf v. Geren, in which the Court held that it
was improper to issue a preliminary injunction because of serious
jurisdictional questions without considering the actual merits of the case.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 36-37.
138. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929).
139. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 36-37 (citing Ohio Oil, 279 U.S. at 814).
140. Id. (quoting Ohio Oil, 279 U.S. at 814).
141. Id. (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 975-76 (1997)).
142. See id. at 37.
143. Id.
144. See id. (citing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 37576, 381 (2008)).
145. See id.
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The Second Circuit concluded that Munaf had no application to the serious
questions standard because serious jurisdictional questions and serious
questions as to the merits are different issues.146
Finally, the Citigroup court set out what is probably its most telling
justification for adhering to the serious questions alternative in spite of
recent Supreme Court decisions. It stated that despite all arguments that the
Supreme Court has implicitly done away with the alternative, it has yet to
explicitly do so.147 The court pointed out that the Second Circuit
“recognized this flexible standard since at least 1953.”148 The court argued
that not only does the long history of the standard justify its continued use,
but the fact it has yet to be overturned in over five decades speaks to its
credence.149 In the Second Circuit’s view, “[i]f the Supreme Court had
meant . . . to abrogate the more flexible standard for a preliminary
injunction” and thus eliminate over five decades of Second Circuit
jurisprudence it would have explicitly done so.150
IV. Analysis
A. Citigroup Ignores the Language of Winter
Citigroup held that the serious questions alternative to likelihood of
success on the merits is not inconsistent with Winter and thus remains
valid.151 The Second Circuit justified its narrow reading of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Winter because the Supreme Court refrained from
considering the merits of the parties’ claims and never even mentioned the
serious question alternative.152 Essentially, the Citigroup court argued that
because the letter of the law handed down in Winter fails expressly to
negate the serious questions alternative, the Winter decision is irrelevant to
the issue of the validity of that alternative.153 Citigroup is correct that
Winter did not expressly address the serious questions alternative.
However, by failing to give due consideration to the language used by the
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit improperly narrowed the standard set
forth in Winter and allowed for constructive elimination of a requirement
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id.
See id. at 38.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 35-38.
See id. at 37.
See id.
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dictated by the Supreme Court. If the serious questions alternative
contradicts the Supreme Court’s standard in Winter, then Winter should be
read as a de facto overruling of the serious questions alternative.
1. Citigroup Improperly Weakens the Winter Standard For Preliminary
Injunctions
When setting forth the requirements for the granting of a preliminary
injunction, the Winter Court clearly and unmistakably used mandatory
language.154 The Court stated, among other things: “[a] plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits. . . .”155 This idea did not originate with Winter. Rather, the concept
can be traced back to Doran v. Salem Inn Inc., in which the Supreme Court
stated that a traditional requirement for granting a preliminary injunction is
that the movant demonstrate “that he is likely to prevail on the merits.”156
After Doran, the Supreme Court again acknowledged the “well-established
principle that the party seeking [a preliminary injunction] bears the burden
of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits.”157 The Supreme
Court has also held that the standard for a preliminary injunction is
“stringent”.158 Thus, in the context of preliminary injunctions, the use of
the word “must” should not be read lightly.
Despite the well-established principle that the movant demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits and the use of the word “must” in
Winter, Citigroup holds that a movant may be granted a preliminary
injunction by demonstrating something less than a likelihood of success.159
By ignoring the strict, mandatory language of the Supreme Court, Citigroup
weakens the Winter standard and essentially transforms the Court’s
language from mandatory to precatory.160 Under the serious questions
alternative, as articulated in Citigroup, a movant is not required to
demonstrate likelihood of success in order to enjoin another party from
engaging in a specific action. Rather, demonstrating likelihood of success
proves to be merely an option that a party may or may not utilize on its path

154. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
155. Id. (emphasis added)
156. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
157. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428
(2006).
158. See Doran, 422 U.S. at 931-32.
159. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598
F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010).
160. See id.
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to receiving an order for preliminary injunction.161 Citigroup allows this
result despite the fact that there is no indication that the Supreme Court
intended the word “must” to mean anything less than a mandate.162 On the
contrary, it is arguable that the inclusion of a specific, mandatory
requirement overrules or excludes the use of other requirements that would
alter, narrow, or weaken that specific requirement.163 As a result, the nature
of the serious questions alternative clearly violates and weakens the
mandatory nature of Winter’s standard.
Citigroup attempts to negate criticism that its holding weakens Winter by
stating that, in order to utilize the serious questions alternative, the movant
must also demonstrate “that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in her
favor.”164 According to the Second Circuit, since the Winter standard
requires only a showing of the balance of hardships tipping in the movant’s
favor, the Citigroup standard remains as strict as the Winter standard.165
Citigroup fails to acknowledge that the serious questions alternative is more
flexible for the movant, because it allows the movant two paths to securing
a preliminary injunction whereas the Winter standard allows only one. In
Citigroup, the Second Circuit noted the district court’s initial consideration
of whether CGMI had established a probability of success on the merits. 166
After ruling that CGMI was unable to establish such a probability, the
district court considered whether the serious questions standard saved
CGMI’s motion for preliminary injunction.167 This is significant because it
demonstrates that, in the Second Circuit at least, a movant does not have to
choose between the likelihood of success path or the serious questions path
at the beginning of the proceeding and stay on that path until the end.
Rather, a petitioner can start out by arguing likelihood of success and use
the serious questions path as a safety net should the likelihood of success
argument fail. As a result, the serious questions alternative is much broader
than the Winter standard. Under the strict language of Winter, CGMI’s
161. See id.
162. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374-76 (2008).
163. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-47
(4th Cir. 2009) (holding that Winter overrules the use of a balancing approach because the
strict language in Winter negates the use of the lighter serious questions standard), partially
vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010).
164. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35 (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons Inc.,
596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 33.
167. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., No.
08-CV-5520 (BSJ), 2008 WL 4891229, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008).
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motion for preliminary injunction should have been denied after likelihood
of success could not be established. Winter’s mandatory language allows
only one path to being awarded a preliminary injunction—by
demonstrating, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits.168
CGMI’s motion was not denied, however, because under the Second
Circuit’s standard, an alternative existed: CGMI could take the serious
questions path to a preliminary injunction.169 The second path was
available to CGMI only because the Second Circuit inaccurately read the
language in Winter as optional, not mandatory. If the likelihood of success
route was truly treated as mandatory, no other option should have been
available. If the Supreme Court had intended to allow the weakening of its
standard, one would expect it either to mention such intention or to refrain
from using language suggesting that a party must establish likelihood of
success on the merits. As a result, even though Winter does not speak
directly to the serious questions alternative, the strict, mandatory language
used by the Court should be read as a de facto rejection of that alternative.
It can be argued, and in fact is argued by the Second Circuit, that the
Winter Court did not intend to invalidate the serious questions alternative
by excluding it from the standard it set forth because the serious questions
alternative was not at issue in the that case.170 This is a valid argument that
is probably the primary reason why some circuits continue to use the
serious questions alternative.171 Significantly, the Winter case arrived at the
Supreme Court out of the Ninth Circuit.172 The Ninth Circuit continuously
propounds a serious questions alternative in its articulation of the standard
for preliminary injunctions.173 Moreover, in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Winter, the court included the serious questions alternative in its statement
of the requirements for preliminary injunction.174 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court was aware of the Ninth Circuit’s use of the serious
questions alternative. Despite this fact the Winter Court created no
exception to the requirement that a party must show a likelihood of success
168. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
169. See Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 33-34.
170. Id. at 37.
171. See id.; Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 208360,
at *4-7 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011).
172. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374.
173. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 677 (9th Cir.
2008); Dollar Rent a Car of Wash., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 774 F.2d 1371, 1374-75
(9th Cir. 1985); Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d
1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980).
174. Winter, 518 F.3d at 677.
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in order to be awarded a preliminary injunction.175 Citigroup, however,
reasons that because the Winter Court withheld any discussion on
likelihood of success, then Winter is irrelevant to the validity of the serious
questions alternative.176 Actually, the Winter Court withheld a discussion
of whether the movant in that case had demonstrated a likelihood of
success.177 The Court chose not to discuss whether the movant had
demonstrated this requirement because it had already determined, based on
other grounds, that the lower court’s granting of a preliminary injunction
was erroneous.178 Failure to determine specifically whether the movant had
demonstrated a likelihood of success fails to render Winter irrelevant to the
serious questions alternative. Winter expressly stated that demonstrating a
likelihood of success is a requirement that a movant must meet in order to
be awarded a preliminary injunction.179 Furthermore, the Winter Court did
not state that a plaintiff must establish likelihood of success only in the
context of the case at hand, but simply affirmed that a requirement in
preliminary injunction cases in general is that the party seeking the
injunction must establish that it is likely to succeed on the merits.180 This
arguably supports the Court’s intention to establish a uniform standard for
preliminary injunctions. If that were the intent of the Court, the expression
of the requirements in Winter should be read to negate all substitutes for
demonstrating likelihood of success as well as any language weakening
those requirements.
2. Citigroup Not Only Softens Winter, It Constructively Eliminates a
Requirement Dictated By the Supreme Court
Citigroup states that the Supreme Court has not issued a decision that
negatively affects the serious questions standard,181 yet every time a court
applies that standard it not only weakens the language used in Winter but
also eliminates a requirement that the Supreme Court has continually
mandated must be established.182 In Munaf v. Geren, the Supreme Court
emphasized the extraordinary nature of preliminary relief: “a party seeking
175. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374.
176. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598
F.3d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 2010).
177. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 374.
180. See id.
181. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 37-38.
182. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 931 (1975).
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a preliminary injunction must demonstrate, among other things ‘a
likelihood of success on the merits.’”183
In Munaf, the Supreme Court considered whether “United States district
courts may exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin” the United States
military from handing over individuals detained in another country to that
country’s government for criminal prosecution.184 The district court
enjoined the military from doing so, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, stating
that the issue of whether the court had jurisdiction “presented questions so
serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for
litigation and thus for more deliberative investigation.”185 Accordingly, the
D.C. Circuit never concluded that the movant demonstrated a likelihood of
success. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the district court abused
its discretion because it issued an injunction based on “the view that the
‘jurisdictional issues’ . . . were tough, without even considering the merits
of the underlying habeas petition.”186 The Court stressed that “one searches
the opinions below in vain for any mention of a likelihood of success as to
the merits. . . .”187
Citigroup disregarded Munaf and claimed that “[t]he Supreme Court
vacated that injunction on the grounds that a ‘likelihood of jurisdiction’ was
irrelevant to the preliminary injunction consideration and could not
substitute for a consideration of the merits.”188 This analysis is a
misinterpretation of Munaf. In actuality, the Munaf Court did not vacate the
injunction because of the irrelevance of the likelihood of jurisdiction issue.
Instead, the Court vacated the preliminary injunction because the lower
court failed to take any consideration of the movant’s likelihood of success
on the merits.189 The decision turned on the fact that the lower court
inappropriately substituted one issue, likelihood of jurisdiction, for the
requirement that the movant demonstrate that he was likely to succeed on
the merits.190

183. Munaf 553 U.S. at 690 (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006)).
184. Id. at 689.
185. Id. at 690 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 416 F.Supp.2d 19, 23-24, 27 (DC 2006).
186. Id. at 690-91.
187. Id. at 690.
188. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598
F.3d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 2010).
189. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 690.
190. See id. at 689-91.
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The Citigroup court made the very same mistake.191 The Second
Circuit’s test for a preliminary injunction, as articulated in Citigroup,
allows for an injunction to be granted if the movant can show, among other
things, “either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party
requesting the preliminary relief.”192 The test is either/or, meaning that if a
party shows serious questions as to the merits coupled with the hardships
tipping decidedly in its favor it can treat that as a substitution for the
likelihood of success requirement.193 Consideration of the seriousness of
the questions going to the merits of a case is not synonymous with
consideration of the likelihood of success on the merits themselves. A
party may be able to show that the merits of a particular case are complex
and the factual record incomplete but that is a far cry from demonstrating
that the party has a strong enough case, at the time the motion for
preliminary injunction is made, to demonstrate that the party’s claim is
likely to succeed at trial.194 Consequently, like the lower court in Munaf,
Citigroup inappropriately allows a substitution for the likelihood of success
requirement. According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Munaf, the
serious questions alternative should be viewed as an abuse of discretion
because it allows a preliminary injunction to be issued without the court
ever considering whether the movant is likely to succeed on the merits.
The Citigroup court also minimized the Munaf decision by reasoning
that the Supreme Court did not define “likelihood of success” in its
holding.195 Therefore, according to the Second Circuit, likelihood of
success does not necessarily have to mean that a claim is more likely than
not to succeed.196 Although the Supreme Court did not define likelihood of
success, it did maintain that a movant must demonstrate that he is likely to
succeed.197 Not only does the Second Circuit’s version of the standard for a
preliminary injunction give district courts the discretion to define likelihood
191. See Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35.
192. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596
F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)).
193. See id.
194. See id. at 33-34 (holding that CGMI was able to prove that the complexities of the
case were enough to establish serious questions as to the merits but was unable to prove
likelihood of success on those merits).
195. Id. at 37.
196. Id. at 34-35.
197. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690-91 (2008); Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
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of success, it also grants courts wide discretion to completely remove the
requirement from the equation.198 Even though it does not explicitly say so,
the Second Circuit gives its district courts the power to overrule the
Supreme Court’s mandate that a party seeking a preliminary injunction
must demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits.
Citigroup does attempt to justify the serious questions alternative and its
corresponding elimination of a requirement dictated by the Supreme Court.
The Second Circuit reasoned that since the movant must demonstrate that
the balance of hardships tips decidedly in his favor, the movant’s burden is
equal to the burden of establishing likelihood of success.199 Citigroup’s
rationale depends on the validity of the idea that removing one factor and
replacing it with an increased burden as to another factor results in an
overall equal burden on the moving party.200 Yet the facts of Citigroup
itself contradict this argument. In Citigroup, in order for CGMI to prove
that it was likely to succeed, it would have had to show that some of its
employees who worked on the credit swap were, at the time of the swap,
acting as representatives of Citibank, which was an affiliate of CGMI, not
CGMI itself.201 Not only was the fact pattern of Citigroup complex, but
according to the Second Circuit, the issue of whether VCG was a customer
of CGMI was in sharp dispute due to contradictions in the record.202
Obviously, proving likelihood of success was extremely difficult in this
scenario. In fact, the district court found that CGMI could not prove that it
was likely to succeed.203 In contrast, all CGMI had to do in order to prove
that the balance of hardships tipped decidedly in its favor was to show that
“an injunction would simply freeze the arbitration without destroying
VCG’s ability to continue that arbitration” should CGMI lose its suit for a
permanent injunction.204 Proving probable success on a complicated fact
pattern that is in sharp dispute should not be considered an equal burden to
the burden of showing that the party opposing a preliminary injunction of
arbitration can simply continue that arbitration should it eventually win the
injunction case. In fact patterns like Citigroup at least, proving that the
balance of hardships tips decidedly in one’s favor is much easier than
198. See Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35 (stating that a movant has to show a likelihood of
success or serious questions as to the merits, but not both).
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 31-34.
202. Id. at 39.
203. Id. at 33.
204. Id. at 34.
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proving probability of success on the merits. Therefore, the reality is that
eliminating or weakening one requirement and increasing the burden as to
another does not always equal the burden of having to establish all of the
original requirements.
B. Citigroup Ignores the Reasoning Used by the Supreme Court in Winter
Winter should be interpreted to eliminate the serious questions standard
as a substitute for demonstrating likelihood of success on the merits.205
Noting the Court’s “frequently reiterated standard [that] requires plaintiffs
seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in
the absence of injunction,” the Winter Court held that demonstrating a mere
possibility of irreparable harm was “too lenient” to justify granting a
preliminary injunction.206 To prove that its standard was “frequently
reiterated,” Winter cited Los Angeles v. Lyons, in which the Supreme Court
held that an injunction was inappropriate “absent a showing of irreparable
injury. . . .”207 The importance of Winter’s discussion as to the appropriate
standard for demonstrating irreparable harm lies in its emphasis on the
word “likely.”208 The Court held that likely meant something stronger than
the possibility of injury.209 The Court reached this conclusion not because
the irreparable injury factor is more important than the other factors but
because of the extraordinary nature of the remedy.210 Other Supreme Court
precedent has similarly emphasized the extraordinary nature of preliminary
injunctions. As a result, parties have no absolute right to such relief.211 The
Winter Court highlighted the extraordinary nature of preliminary relief as
the reason why a strong demonstration of a likelihood of success is not
enough to balance out the inability to establish that irreparable harm is
likely.212 For practical purposes, this reasoning eliminated the use of a
sliding scale to balance out a weak showing on irreparable harm, but not
because of the importance of that specific factor. Rather, the basis for the
Court’s reasoning was the overall drastic nature of the relief.
205. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374-76 (2008).
206. Id. at 375.
207. Id. (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983).
208. See id. (“Our frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary
relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”).
209. Id. at 375-76.
210. See id.
211. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (stating that
injunctive relief is not a matter of right even in cases where the movant may eventually
suffer irreparable harm); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944).
212. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375-76.
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In light of Winter’s rationale, it would seem appropriate to revert back to
the Court’s “frequently reiterated standard” to determine the appropriate
burden for demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits. When
stating the test for a preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court has
continually emphasized that the movant must demonstrate that he is likely
to succeed on the merits.213 In Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance
Bond Fund, Inc., Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that a plaintiff seeking
preliminary relief must demonstrate both a likelihood of success and that
“[p]laintiffs with questionable claims would not meet the likelihood of
success criterion.”214 Furthermore, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it
is a “well established principle” that a movant seeking a preliminary
injunction must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.215 It is
true, as Citigroup points out, that the Supreme Court in Ohio Oil Co. v.
Conway issued a favorable ruling vis-à-vis the serious questions
standard.216 It should be noted, however, that Ohio Oil Co. was decided in
1929, before the Court laid out the traditional factors in Doran,217 before
demonstrating a likelihood of success was acknowledged as a “well
established principle” as it was in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,218 and before Winter stated that likelihood of
success must be established.219 Whatever the test in 1929, it appears
evident that, in the eight decades since Ohio Oil Co. was decided, the
Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed that a movant seeking a
preliminary injunction must demonstrate a likelihood of success.220
Applying these precedents, the Winter Court stated, “a plaintiff seeking
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, [and] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm.”221 Given the
frequently reiterated standard for demonstrating likelihood of success
213. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 340 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975).
214. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 527 U.S. at 340 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
215. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428
(2006).
216. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598
F.3d 30, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2010).
217. Doran, 422 U.S. at 932.
218. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 428.
219. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
220. See id.; Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 428; Doran, 422 U.S. at 932.
221. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374 (emphasis added).
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coupled with Winter’s own discussion of the term “likely,” it makes no
sense to suggest that the Winter Court intended the first “likely” to have a
less stringent application than the second “likely.” The Court clearly
intended the requirement that a movant demonstrate that he is “likely” to
suffer irreparable harm to mean more than a mere possibility of irreparable
harm balanced out by the strength of another factor. It follows that
requiring a movant to show that he is “likely” to succeed on the merits also
means that he must demonstrate more than serious questions as to the
merits coupled with the balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the
movant’s favor.
Significantly, Winter cited Mazurek v. Armstrong and stated that
awarding a preliminary injunction despite the movant’s failure to establish
one of the requirements “is inconstant with [the Supreme Court’s]
characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may
only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such
relief.”222 In Mazurek, the Court considered a challenge to a Montana law
prohibiting all but licensed physicians from performing abortions.223 The
main issue before Mazurek Court was whether the petitioners, who were
seeking to enjoin Montana from enforcing the law, had adequately
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.224 In determining that
the petitioners had not made an adequate showing of likelihood of success,
the Court stated that the burden of proof that an injunction is proper is
“much higher” than the proof necessary for a summary judgment.225 As a
result, the Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s grant of an injunction.
According to Mazurek, the drastic and extraordinary nature of relief dictates
that an injunction should be granted only upon a clear showing that the
movant has carried the burden of persuasion concerning likelihood of
success.226 Mazurek’s requirement that likelihood of success be clearly
shown in order for preliminary relief to be granted supplements Winter’s
requirement that irreparable harm must be demonstrated on its own clear
showing regardless of the strength of another factor. Winter’s citation of
Mazurek to justify its holding should be read to support the conclusion that
each of the Winter factors must be clearly shown on its own and that the
strength of one factor cannot balance out the weakness of another.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 375-76 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).
Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 969.
Id. at 969-71.
Id. at 972.
Id.
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In contrast, the serious questions standard allows a plaintiff to be granted
a preliminary injunction without demonstrating a likelihood of success.227
This can only be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s continued
requirement that a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of success if a
stronger showing of other factors coupled with a serious question on the
merits does in fact demonstrate likelihood of success. But such an
argument goes directly against the reasoning of Winter. Some may argue
that the reasoning in Winter should apply only to the irreparable harm
requirement because of the importance of that factor.228 However, that idea
is found nowhere in Winter. Indeed, the Court explicitly stated that its
decision was based on the extraordinary nature of injunctive relief as a
whole. The Court did not even remotely suggest that the importance of the
irreparable harm factor influenced its decision.229 Therefore, it simply does
not follow that the Supreme Court would agree that the extraordinariness of
preliminary injunctions prohibits a sliding scale to be applied to irreparable
harm but allows one to be applied to the other factors. The reasoning in
Winter should be read to invalidate the serious questions alternative because
that alternative allows a lack of demonstrating one factor, likelihood of
success, to be balanced out by the heightened strength of another factor.
C. The Serious Questions Alternative Eliminates an Important Protection
for Parties Opposing Preliminary Injunction and Turns an Extraordinary
Remedy into an Ordinary One
Requiring a party to prove likelihood of success on the merits erects an
important protection for those defending against preliminary injunctions.230
A preliminary injunction prevents a party from taking specific action prior
to a case being decided.231 In other words, a preliminary injunction gives
one party the same relief before a trial that it would receive after a complete
trial, albeit on a temporary basis.232 Because preliminary injunctions grant
relief prior to a full hearing on the merits, an injunction is considered
harsh.233 Citigroup itself stated that “[t]he very purpose of an injunction . . .
227. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.,
598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010).
228. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that irreparable harm is the sine qua non of the preliminary injunction test).
229. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008).
230. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-46
(4th Cir. 2009), partially vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010).
231. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 358 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
232. Real Truth About Obama, 575 F.3d at 345-47.
233. DOBBS, supra note 9, at 187.
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is to give temporary relief based on a preliminary estimate of the strength of
a plaintiff’s suit, prior to the resolution at trial of the factual disputes and
The likelihood of success
difficulties presented by the case.”234
requirement serves as protection to an opposing party. The requirement
prevents an opposing party from having to endure temporary defeat despite
the fact that the movant has little to no chance of winning at trial.235
Therefore, a preliminary injunction should be inappropriate “[n]o matter
how severe and irreparable an injury one seeking [the] preliminary
injunction may suffer in its absence . . . if there is no chance that the
movant will eventually prevail on the merits.”236 Serious questions on the
merits, coupled with a showing that the balance of hardships tips decidedly
in the movant’s favor, estimates the level of harm the movant may suffer
but not the strength of the suit overall. The balance of hardships is
irrelevant to the likelihood of success requirement. If the movant cannot
demonstrate he is likely to succeed on the merits, he should not be allowed
to prevent another party from exercising its right to act.237 Although it may
seem strict to prohibit a party who is under threat of irreparable harm to
enjoin another from causing that harm prior to the outcome of a case solely
because the movant cannot establish likelihood of success, preliminary
relief is a drastic remedy and, as such, “is the exception rather than the
rule.”238
Citigroup states that the rationale behind the serious questions
alternative, and consequently the removal of the protection that the
likelihood of success requirement erects, is that limiting preliminary
injunctions to cases in which the movant can demonstrate a likelihood of
success would confine the relief “to cases that are simple or easy.”239 This
rationale erroneously assumes that preliminary injunctions should be
available in all types of cases. In fact, preliminary injunctions should
instead be awarded only in extraordinary cases.240 Furthermore, just
because a case is complex does not necessarily mean that a party cannot
234. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598
F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 53, § 2948.3).
235. Real Truth About Obama, 575 F.3d at 345-46.
236. Texas v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1975).
237. Id.
238. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Seatrain, 518 F.2d
at 179).
239. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35.
240. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (stating that injunctive
relief is not a matter of right even in cases where the movant may eventually suffer
irreparable harm); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944).
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demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.241 A movant, in order to
satisfy the likelihood of success requirement, “is not required to prove to a
moral certainty that his is the only correct position.”242 Likelihood of
success simply requires a determination of the probable outcome at the time
the request for preliminary injunction is made.243 It does not require the
court to determine who will ultimately win once the case has been
presented in full.244 In the Second Circuit, however, even if a party is
unable to prove likelihood of success due to the complexities of the case,
that party must be given the same chance to obtain preliminary relief as
parties with simpler cases. This flies directly in the face of the constant
affirmation of the Supreme Court that the granting of a preliminary
injunction is not a matter of right.245 It may be true that it is an
extraordinary case in which, in the face of complex or incomplete facts, the
movant can demonstrate at the time a preliminary injunction is sought that
he is likely to succeed. Yet this only proves the point that preliminary
injunctions are only to be granted in extraordinary cases.
Because of the danger of making requirements for a preliminary
injunction so inflexible that it becomes unavailable as a remedy,
Citigroup’s policy consideration for utilizing the serious questions
alternative should be given proper regard. In fact, equitable relief
originated because of the rigid nature of the English writ system. Due to
inflexibility, injustices lacked remedy.246 The Second Circuit’s policy
consideration, however, must be balanced against the extraordinary nature
of preliminary injunctions. A preliminary injunction gives the court power
to compel action of a party, despite the fact that there is “[a] possibility that
preliminary relief will prove to be erroneous when a full trial on the merits
is held.”247 The extraordinary nature of this relief is evident: “[n]early
every judicial opinion addressing a request for preliminary injunctive relief
recognizes the historical principle that such relief is a drastic remedy to be
granted sparingly. . . .”248 A recent study of relevant case law, however,
revealed that between 2003 and 2006 forty-percent of motions for
241. See Seatrain, 518 F.2d at 180-81.
242. Id.
243. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1991).
244. Id.
245. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312 (stating that injunctive relief is not a matter of right
even in cases where the movant may eventually suffer irreparable harm); Yakus, 321 U.S. at
440.
246. See WALKER, supra note 22, at 43-44.
247. DOBBS, supra note 9, at 253.
248. STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
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preliminary injunction were granted in federal district courts.249 Clearly, a
once extraordinary remedy is on its way to becoming ordinary in our legal
system.250 If Citigroup’s reasoning that preliminary injunctions should be
available in all types of cases, not just extraordinary ones, is followed, the
granting of preliminary injunctions will continue its path towards normalcy.
Winter acknowledged that its reason for narrowing the standard for
preliminary injunction was to uphold the belief that such relief is “an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that
the plaintiff is entitled to [it].”251 Thus, even if the Second Circuit’s policy
consideration is valid, Winter indicates that the current Supreme Court may
be inclined to sacrifice availability of preliminary injunctions to parties with
complex cases in order to protect the remedy’s extraordinary status.
Requiring a party to demonstrate likelihood of success, while possibly
making it harder for parties with complex cases to obtain a preliminary
injunction, serves to protect the extraordinary nature of this harsh remedy.
V. Conclusion
In Citigroup, the Second Circuit sidestepped Supreme Court precedent in
an effort to sustain five decades of its own jurisprudence.252 The strongest
argument Citigroup makes to justify its avoidance of that precedent is that
the Supreme Court never explicitly stated that it was overruling the serious
questions alternative.253 A closer look at Winter, however, reveals that the
Court explicitly used mandatory, strict language to set forth the requirement
that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish likelihood of
success.254
Winter’s mandatory language should be interpreted as
overruling the serious questions alternative, despite the fact that the Court
never expressly addressed that alternative, because a lesser standard
transforms the Court’s language from mandatory to optional. Moreover,
the reasoning used by the Court can be read to require that all the Winter
factors for a preliminary injunction be clearly established without the
strength of one factor compensating for the weakness of another.255 The

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008).
252. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.,
598 F.3d 30, 35, 38 (2d Cir. 2010).
253. See id. at 38.
254. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374.
255. See id. at 374-76.
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only way Citigroup can stand is if this aspect of Winter is completely
disregarded.
Because the English Court of Chancery failed to implement concrete
legal principles to govern awarding of relief, some of this nation’s founding
fathers feared arbitrary rulings concerning equitable remedies.256 For too
long the federal circuit courts have been in disagreement over the
appropriate standards and requirements for determining whether a
preliminary injunction is appropriate in a particular case.257 The Supreme
Court, in Winter, took a monumental step forward in establishing a uniform,
concrete test for the granting of preliminary injunctions. However, in an
effort to sustain decades’ worth of Second Circuit jurisprudence, the
Citigroup court improperly narrowed Winter and other Supreme Court
precedent.258 If a court can take requirements dictated by years of Supreme
Court precedent and eliminate or replace those requirements at its
convenience, arbitrary rule is the result. If each federal court is allowed to
disregard Supreme Court reasoning and language when it comes to
preliminary injunctions, then valuable safeguards for defendants will be
abandoned. Allowing the requirements for preliminary injunctions to be
changed or weakened, depending on the complexity of the case at hand, is
one step closer to the preliminary injunction becoming the rule rather than
the exception. Allowing preliminary injunctions to be issued absent a
showing that the movant is likely to succeed on the merits is similarly one
step closer to turning an extraordinary remedy into an ordinary one.
Jacob S. Crawford

256. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-4.
257. See LAYCOCK, supra note 55, at 118.
258. See Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35-38.
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